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What makes a person more likely to engage in an extramarital affair, and are there 
systematic differences between men and women? These complex questions have 
been central to the empirical and theoretical literature on infidelity since its 
interception in economics with Fair (1978). One factor that is often found important 
is happiness and/or marital happiness. Men and women who are happy are less 
likely to have an affair. This intuitive and somewhat unsurprising result, however, 
is fraught with an endogeneity problem. This paper utilizes a recursive 
simultaneous-equations model that circumvents the endogeneity issue. Using data 
from the U.S. General Social Survey, we find that given equal ‘prices’ men and 
women choose differently when making decisions related to marital infidelity. Our 
estimates also show that happiness with marriage is the single most relevant factor 
explaining infidelity for both men and women. Social class, age, and divorced status 
also affect the likelihood of infidelity. Somewhat surprising, demographic factors 
including educational attainment seem to not affect infidelity. 
Keywords: infidelity, happiness, marriage, bivariate probit, endogeneity 
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I. Introduction 
As an area of research within the economics of marriage literature, infidelity has become 
more popular lately. And for good reason: infidelity is a leading cause of divorce, spousal abuse, 
as well as other less visible marital issues such as decreased trust, security, and general happiness. 
While each of these issues represents personal adversity, they also imply externalities that affect 
children, relatives, and society at large (e.g. lower academic achievement of children from 
divorced families and increases in court costs). Thus, there are negative consequences of marital 
infidelity for society. While studies in psychology and sociology provide a myriad of explanations 
for infidelity, the empirical analysis of the determinants of infidelity is subject to significant 
limitations, including in studies conducted by economists (e.g. Fair, 1978; Cameron, 2002; Wells, 
2003; Elmslie and Tebaldi, 2008; Potter, 2011; Brooks and Monaco, 2012; Smith, 2012; and 
Adamopoulou, 2013).  
The two extant models of infidelity in the economics literature were developed by Fair 
(1978) and Elmslie and Tebaldi (2008). While both will be discussed below, it is fair to say that 
the existing empirical work on the economics of infidelity is loosely related to the extant theories 
(Fair, 1978; Elmslie and Tebaldi, 2008), focusing mainly on how socio-economic factors affect 
marital infidelity (Cameron, 2002; Potter, 2011). This study addresses several concerns with the 
existing economic literature on infidelity. Throughout the main literature, one result has remained 
consistently significant: men and women who are happier generally or within their marriage are 
less likely to have an affair. This consistency also highlights a major weakness in all of the 
literature on infidelity to date (Li and Racine, 2004; Elmslie and Tebaldi, 2008; Potter, 2011; and 
Adamopoulou, 2013). Each study fails to recognize the potential endogeneity of happiness as a 
regressor in the infidelity equation, which certainly deems this conclusion as unreliable as the 
estimated coefficients are biased. Additionally, Cheng and Smyth (2015) use Chinese data to 
examine the reverse effect of infidelity on happiness. They find that extramarital affairs negatively 
affect happiness but fail to control for endogeneity. There are also concerns regarding the measure 
of infidelity itself in these studies, as discussed below.  
In this paper, we ask the questions: what are the key factors affecting a person’s behavior 
with respect to infidelity, and are there gender-related differences linked to infidelity? We 
contribute to the economics of marriage literature by providing a robust empirical analysis of the 
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factors affecting a person’s behavior toward infidelity. First, our empirical strategy circumvents 
the happiness-infidelity endogeneity problem that plagues previous analysis of infidelity. 
Endogeneity produces biased coefficient estimates, thus leading to unreliable conclusions. Our 
approach by-passes the search for an elusive instrument by relying on relationships among the 
joint, conditional, and marginal probabilities of a bivariate probit model as demonstrated in the 
work of Burnett (1997), Greene (1998; 2008), and Li, Poskitt and Zhao (2019). More precisely, 
we use an empirical approach that treats marital infidelity and happiness with marriage as jointly 
determined outcomes that can be estimated via a recursive bivariate probit model. This approach 
has recently been demonstrated to be a “resilient empirical tool for estimating the effect of an 
endogenous binary regressor on a binary outcome variable.” (Li, Poskitt and Zhao, 2019, p. 112) 
Second, we improve previous empirical analysis of infidelity by using comprehensive data 
from the General Social Survey (GSS) from 1991 to 2012 and better metrics that capture the 
complexity of both marital happiness and infidelity. We code a person as having had an 
extramarital affair if she/he is married and had more than one sex partner in the last year. This 
metric is significantly different from that used by Elmslie and Tebaldi (2008) and Smith (2012) 
using GSS data, or Potter (2011) using National Youth Survey (NYS) data. The former studies 
code a person as having had an extramarital affair if she/he had ever had sex with a person other 
than the spouse while married. The latter study measures infidelity in terms of the frequency with 
which a person, during a year, engages in extramarital sexual relationships. The major problem 
with Elmslie and Tebaldi (2008) and Smith (2012) is not the metric of infidelity itself, but how it 
is included in the empirical model because most covariates are measured contemporaneously while 
the measure of infidelity represents a long-run “stock” that was likely determined by factors other 
than the contemporaneous variables included in their regressions. Potter's (2011) proxy for 
infidelity, on the other hand, measures the intensity of the affair, rather than the likelihood that a 
married person may engage in an extramarital affair. Our study also employs a measure of 
happiness that focuses on happiness with the marriage instead of general happiness (used by 
Elmslie and Tebaldi, 2008). 
Third, our empirical strategy and data set allow for an empirical test of the main 
implications of the extant models in the economics literature of Fair (1978) and Elmslie and 
Tebaldi (2008). More precisely, Fair (1978) proposes a theoretical model based on the preference 
for variety. Given such a preference, individuals divide their time between work and leisure time 
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that could be spent with either one’s spouse or with a paramour. There are three major implications 
of this model. First, given that there is no a priori reason to assume that preferences are gender 
specific, men and women are expected to respond similarly to the various costs and benefits of 
infidelity. Second, given diminishing returns to time spent with one’s spouse, time spent with a 
paramour is an increasing function of marital tenure. Finally, increased utility received from time 
spent with a spouse decreases time spent with a paramour. This leads to the prediction that 
increased marital happiness decreases infidelity equally for both genders.  Other work has 
previously empirically evaluated Fair (1978). Pagan and Vella (1989) and Wells (2003) are not 
interested in the topic of infidelity as much as they are interested in applications of econometric 
techniques developed since Fair (1978). These studies use the Psychology Today data set used by 
Fair (1978). Pagan and Vella (1989) check for normality, heteroskedasticity and omitted variable 
bias in Fair’s (1978) Tobit equation and find that the model fails all the tests, which caused them 
to cast serious doubt on the basic result that infidelity increases with time in marriage. Wells (2003) 
recompute the exact tests performed by Pagan and Vella (1989) and find that the original Fair 
model actually passes all of the tests, indicating a mistake in their econometric work. Thus, Wells 
(2003) re-establishes the results of Fair, with special emphasis on the marriage tenure and infidelity 
result. However, using nonparametric methods, Li and Racine (2004) find no relation between 
marital tenure and infidelity. Additionally, Chernozhukov and Hong (2002) find a negative 
relationship between tenure and infidelity. The preponderance of the evidence is that the 
relationship is weak and possibly negative in Fair’s original data. 
Elmslie and Tebaldi (2008) develop an expected utility model where the expectations are 
driven partly by biology. The evolutionary biology view suggests that the sex drive in both men 
and women comes from each individual’s instinctive desire to pass one’s own genes onto the next 
generation. Given this basic desire, men have an incentive to spread their seed widely because they 
do not face the direct costs and limitations of pregnancy. Their ability to do this will depend on 
their own gene quality. Women face more stringent costs related to sexual activity. If impregnated, 
they face nine months plus recovery time where they will not be able to be impregnated by another, 
perhaps superior, male. Therefore, a woman’s incentive to stray is dependent on the quality of her 
spouse’s genes relative to those of other available males. In short, the benefits of infidelity differ 
for men and women due to biological differences, while the costs are expected to differ for societal 
and other reasons (e.g. spousal abuse resulting from an affair being discovered). For a more 
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detailed description of differential behavior of men and women regarding infidelity from the 
evolutionary biology and psychology literature, see Trivers (1972; 1986) and Buss (1994). 
Overall, the Elmslie and Tebaldi (2008) model makes three predictions. First, through the 
expected utility function, there is an inverse relation between marital happiness and the probability 
of an affair. Second, stemming from the biological benefits of an affair, there is a negative relation 
between age and the probability of an affair. Given that age and marital tenure are highly 
correlated, this relation also applies to marital tenure (Li and Rocine, 2004). Finally, biological 
differences between men and women in terms of the costs and benefits of pregnancy imply that 
men and women will respond differently to the costs and benefits (i.e. prices) of infidelity. Smith 
(2012) also develops an expected utility model of infidelity driven primarily by preferences and 
the expected costs associated with an affair. His predictions relate to both models of Fair (1978) 
and Elmslie and Tebaldi (2008) and suggest that infidelity propensity is an increasing function of 
an individual’s quality (undefined in the paper), is indeterminate in terms of education, and 
decreasing in terms of expected costs. Utilizing some biological arguments of Elmslie and Tebaldi 
(2008), Smith’s (2012) model allows the infidelity propensity to differ for men and women. 
Our empirical strategy allows for testing the main implications of the extant models of Fair 
(1978) and Elmslie and Tebaldi (2008) and addressing concerns about the endogeneity between 
happiness and infidelity and the infidelity-gender bias that have plagued infidelity-related studies. 
II. The Empirical Model 
There is a large and growing literature studying methods to obtain robust and consistent 
estimates when endogenous variables are present in binary choice models (e.g. Burnett, 1997; 
Angrist, 2001; Blundell and Powell, 2004; Dong and Lewbel, 2015). The available methods 
include control functions, 2SLS with a linear probability model, and the special regressor 
estimator. However, these methods are subject to major limitations and require strong identifying 
assumptions (see Lewbel, Dong, and Yang, 2012; and Dong and Lewbel, 2015). More precisely, 
each of the alternatives above relies on a key requirement: find Z, a set of instruments, that satisfies 
the following conditions: E(Z’)=0 and E(Z’X) has full rank ( is the error term of the equation of 
interest and X are regressors). In addition, these alternative estimators rely on methods to address 
the endogeneity issue where the final step usually consists of estimating a probit-type model. This, 
Series of Unsurprising Results in Economics   
- 6 -  
in turn, requires specifying the distribution of the model’s error term as normal, which is similar 
to the assumption required in a bivariate probit specification. 
The key problem in estimating a model with infidelity and marital happiness (both are 
binary variables) is the evident endogeneity between these two variables and the challenge to find 
an instrument that meets the requirements of any of the four estimation options above. The search 
for such an instrument is elusive, particularly when using information from datasets such as the 
GSS. Altonji et al. (2005) discuss an alternative approach where the amount of selection on the 
observed regressors provides an indication of the amount of selection on the unobservable. Their 
method, however, is highly dependent on a set of restrictive assumptions that are unlikely to be 
met with the set of regressors utilized in our study. In fact, the authors provide a word of caution 
against using their method and state that their method “is only the start of the methodological work 
that is needed. Priorities include a Monte Carlo analysis on how the methods perform in the context 
of real-word examples and systematic look at how the performance of our methods varies with the 
context of major data sets” (p. 182). 
Our approach models infidelity (I) and marriage (un)happiness (U) as jointly determined 
outcomes: 
𝐼∗ = 𝑥1
′ 𝛽1 + 𝛾𝑈 + 𝜀 ,    𝐼 = 1  if 𝐼
∗ > 0,    0 otherwise (1) 
𝑈∗ = 𝑥2
′ 𝛽2 + 𝜐,         𝑈 = 1  if 𝑈
∗ > 0,   0 otherwise (2) 
𝐶𝑜𝑣[𝜀, 𝜐|𝑥1, 𝑥2] = 𝜌, (3) 
where 𝐼∗  and 𝑈∗  are the unobserved latent variables, I is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
person had an extramarital affair last year, U is a dummy variable equal to one if the person is not 
very happy with marriage, 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 are vectors of explanatory variables, 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are parameter 
vectors, and  measures the covariance between the error terms of the infidelity and happiness 
status equations. The vectors 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 include covariates that measure both individual’s 
characteristics as well as his/her spouse’s characteristics. A simplified version of this model can 
also be written as follows: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝐼 = 1, 𝑈 = 1|𝑥1, 𝑥2] = 𝜙(𝑥1
′ 𝛽1 + 𝛾𝑈, 𝑥2
′ 𝛽2, 𝜌), 
where  is the bivariate normal cumulative density function. See Greene (2008: 817-826) for 
details about this specification. 
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The specification above assumes that Equations 1 and 2 are related via their error terms 
(Equation 3), which implies that the probability that a person is not very happy with marriage 
(pr(U=1)) and the probability of infidelity ( pr(I=1)) are not independent, thus these probabilities 
cannot be calculated by just estimating any one of these equations separately. In other words, 
studies that ignore the simultaneity between happiness status and infidelity may produce unreliable 
estimates and, possibly, wrong conclusions. The fact that I does not directly appear in the happiness 
(U) equation is an identification requirement, but it does not imply that happiness does not affect 
infidelity. For instance, the bivariate probit specification implies that pr(U=1 , 
I=1)=pr(U=1)*Pr(I=1|U=1). Thus, under   different from zero, happiness has an indirect 
influence on infidelity. 
Greene (1998, 2008) shows that using a recursive simultaneous-equations model allows 
one to ignore endogeneity in formulating the log-likelihood function while still accounting for the 
fact that the probability of either infidelity or marital happiness is dependent on the probability of 
the other. More precisely, “[W]e can ignore the simultaneity in this model and we cannot in the 
linear regression model because, in this instance, we are maximizing the log-likelihood, whereas 
in the linear regression case, we are manipulating certain sample moments that do not converge to 
the necessary population parameters in the presence of simultaneity.” (Greene, 2008: 823). This 
statistical property produces the “counterintuitive result … that in the bivariate probit model, 
unlike in the linear simultaneous equations model, if the two dependent variables are jointly 
determined, we just put each on the right hand side of the other equation (or, in our case, one of 
them) and proceed as if there were no simultaneity problem.” (Greene, 1998: 295). Furthermore, 
Li, Poskitt and Zhao (2019) also demonstrate that the bivariate probit specification produces robust 
estimates of the effects of an endogenous binary regressor. 
Moreover, the Lagrange multiplier or Wald tests can be used for testing whether the 
correlation between the error terms ( ) is zero. If  equals zero, then the bivariate probit model 
can be specified as two independent univariate probit models. However, if  is different from zero, 
then infidelity (happiness) also has an indirect influence on happiness (infidelity) causing the 
univariate probit model to produce unreliable estimates. In this case, the bivariate probit model is 
preferable. We estimate the recursive bivariate probit model above using maximum-likelihood 
with Huber/White robust standard errors. This approach has been utilized in several recent articles 
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including Appelt (2015), Chen et al. (2014), Zanin et al. (2013), and Magnani (2012), suggesting 
that our approach is being utilized and recognized as a viable and robust option in dealing with 
endogeneity problems when the variables of interest are binary. 
III. Data 
This study uses U.S. data from the General Social Survey. The GSS is the only nationally 
representative survey of attitudes and intergroup relations that monitors trends in attitudes and 
behaviors in the United States. Our dataset pools GSS data from all annual surveys containing 
questions regarding extramarital infidelity and happiness (1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 
2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012). As discussed in the introduction of the paper, we code 
a person as having had an extramarital affair if she/he is married and had more than one sex partner 
in the last year. The data contains a three-category question regarding marital happiness 
specifically. It asks respondents if they are: very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy. Within 
these categories, only 2.9 percent of respondents reported being not too happy in their marriage, 
so we combined pretty happy with not too happy into a category we call not very happy. In coding 
the dummy variable not very happy, responses are given a 0 if the individual answered very happy 
and 1 otherwise. The sample used in this study only includes married people who are between 18 
and 60 (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics). The sample is comprised of 4,607 women and 3,796 
men, from which 2.3 and 4.6 percent, respectively, reported having had sex with more than one 
partner last year. 
IV. Results 
Our empirical analysis addresses endogeneity concerns and demonstrates that single-
equation models of infidelity and happiness produce unreliable results. It also provides evidence 
that men and women respond differently to the costs and benefits of infidelity and that happiness 
with marriage is the single most important relevant factor explaining infidelity for both men and 
women. The results pertaining to the equation not very happy with marriage are not discussed in 
detail here because the focus of this study is on infidelity. Our results, however, are somewhat 
consistent with the literature on this subject (see Elmslie and Tebaldi, 2014; Eyunni, 2011; 
Easterlin, 2003; Cheng and Smyth, 2015). 
The baseline regression results for women and men are reported in Tables 2 and 3, 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 





Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Extramarital affair 2.3% 0.151 4.6% 0.209 
Not very happy with marriage 38.9% 0.487 36.4% 0.481 
BA or graduate degree  29.9% 0.458 34.1% 0.474 
Spouse - BA or graduate degree  30.9% 0.462 30.3% 0.460 
Spouse's labor force participation 86.4% 0.343 69.4% 0.461 
Protestant 56.7% 0.496 53.0% 0.499 
Catholic 25.7% 0.437 24.2% 0.428 
Other religion 7.6% 0.264 8.0% 0.271 
Age 40.00 9.871 41.53 9.581 
White 85.3% 0.354 85.1% 0.356 
Black 7.8% 0.268 8.0% 0.271 
Log population in city-town of 
residence 3.24 1.922 3.31 1.923 
Unemployed 4.2% 0.200 5.6% 0.229 
Housekeeper 24.4% 0.430 1.2% 0.111 
Divorced in the past 24.1% 0.428 24.2% 0.428 
Has child(ren) 84.5% 0.362 82.5% 0.380 
Middle-class 47.4% 0.499 48.4% 0.500 
Upper-class  3.2% 0.177 3.8% 0.192 
Republican party affiliation 30.6% 0.461 35.4% 0.478 
Democratic party affiliation 31.5% 0.464 25.4% 0.436 
Source: Authors' calculations using data from the General Social Survey, 1991-2012. Sample includes married 
people who are 18 to 60 years old. 
respectively. The estimates of  are relatively large (above 0.44 in absolute value) and are 
statistically significant in all bivariate probit models. These results imply that the error terms of 
the “not very happy” with marriage and marital infidelity equations are correlated, and a single- 
equation model is inappropriate in examining the relationship between marital infidelity and 
happiness status. The results also imply that marginal effects using a single-equation model are 
incorrect. We do not include goodness-of-fit statistics in these tables due to the inherent 
difficulties in obtaining meaningful goodness-of-fit metrics for bivariate probit models. 
However, all models were tested using the log-likelihood test and, in all regressions, the null 
hypothesis that all coefficients in the model are statistically equal to zero was rejected at 
conventional levels of significance. 
Similar to a univariate probit model, the coefficients of a bivariate probit model only show 
the direction of the relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables. Calculations of 
marginal effects for a bivariate probit model are cumbersome but possible for several different  
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Table 2: Coefficient Estimates of Recursive Bivariate Probit Models, Women 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Infidelity     
Not very happy with marriage 1.231*** 1.079*** 1.178*** 1.192*** 
 [3.95] [3.14] [3.59] [3.84] 
Spouse has BA or graduate degree -0.00147  -0.00836 -0.0199 
 [-0.01]  [-0.08] [-0.18] 
Spouse's labor force participation -0.251** -0.278** -0.255** -0.252** 
 [-2.35] [-2.37] [-2.36] [-2.37] 
Log size of population in city/town of residence 0.0225 0.0224 0.0236 0.0230 
 [1.03] [0.98] [1.08] [1.06] 
House keeping -0.175* -0.120 -0.177* -0.179* 
 [-1.72] [-1.13] [-1.73] [-1.77] 
Divorced in the past 0.333*** 0.286*** 0.334*** 0.332*** 
 [3.64] [2.91] [3.63] [3.66] 
Age of respondent -0.0346*** -0.0345*** -0.0347*** -0.0348*** 
 [-6.87] [-6.35] [-6.89] [-7.01] 
Spouse’s occupational prestige score  -0.00515   
  [-1.27]   
Middle-class    -0.00248 
    [-0.03] 
Upper-class    0.168 
    [0.66] 
Constant -0.984*** -0.737** -0.973*** -0.972*** 
 [-4.24] [-2.34] [-4.14] [-4.12] 
Dependent Variable: Not Very Happy with Marriage     
Spouse has BA or graduate degree -0.185***  -0.178*** -0.148*** 
 [-3.78]  [-3.63] [-2.94] 
Spouse's labor force participation -0.0974* -0.0827 -0.0950* -0.0875 d 
 [-1.76] [-1.38] [-1.71] [-1.57] 
Log size of population in city/town of residence 0.00841 0.00840 0.00792 0.00949 
 [0.82] [0.78] [0.77] [0.92] 
House keeping -0.0796* -0.100** -0.0780* -0.0736 d 
 [-1.77] [-2.13] [-1.73] [-1.63] 
Divorced in the past -0.0838* -0.0677 d -0.0895* -0.0920** 
 [-1.81] [-1.41] [-1.93] [-1.98] 
Age of respondent 0.00301 0.00292 0.00311 0.00384* 
 [1.47] [1.35] [1.52] [1.86] 
College or graduate degree -0.0993** -0.136*** -0.0918* -0.0665 
 [-2.04] [-2.86] [-1.87] [-1.34] 
Protestant -0.175*** -0.183*** -0.145** -0.171*** 
 [-2.68] [-2.64] [-2.18] [-2.60] 
Catholic -0.110 -0.121 -0.0935 -0.0995 
 [-1.53] [-1.61] [-1.30] [-1.38] 
Other religions -0.222** -0.249** -0.211** -0.208** 
 [-2.44] [-2.51] [-2.31] [-2.28] 
White -0.200*** -0.248*** -0.187** -0.189** 
 [-2.69] [-3.11] [-2.51] [-2.54] 
Black 0.257*** 0.146 0.256** 0.248** 
 [2.61] [1.38] [2.56] [2.51] 
Has child(ren) 0.449*** 0.447*** 0.454*** 0.445*** 
 [7.80] [7.44] [7.88] [7.71] 
Spouse’s occupational prestige score  -0.00612***   
  [-3.79]   
Republican party affiliation   -0.133***  
   [-2.78]  
Democratic party affiliation   -0.0616  
   [-1.33]  
Middle-class    -0.164*** 
    [-3.90] 
Upper-class    -0.0874 
    [-0.75] 
Constant -0.314** -0.0221 -0.299** -0.312** 
 [-2.30] [-0.14] [-2.19] [-2.28] 
Observations 4,607 4,199 4,607 4,607 
 -0.515*** -0.435** -0.486** -0.494** 
Wald Test of =0 (Chi-squared) 6.280 3.825 5.098 5.960 
t statistics in brackets, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, d p< 0.15. The matrix of variance-covariance is calculated 
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using the Huber/White Robust estimator. 
Table 3: Estimates of Recursive Bivariate Probit Models, Men 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Infidelity     
Not very happy with marriage 1.491*** 1.561*** 1.200*** 1.566*** 
 [5.34] [6.38] [2.81] [5.60] 
Spouse has BA or graduate degree  -0.00614  -0.0341 -0.0738 
 [-0.08]  [-0.39] [-0.87] 
Spouse's labor force participation -0.107d -0.0980 -0.110 d -0.0962 
 [-1.51] [-1.24] [-1.48] [-1.38] 
Log size of population in city/town of residence 0.0193 0.0241 0.0226 0.0168 
 [1.15] [1.34] [1.27] [1.00] 
Unemployed 0.0617 0.0778 0.0887 0.0763 
 [0.45] [0.56] [0.63] [0.56] 
Divorced in the past 0.235*** 0.249*** 0.249*** 0.241*** 
 [2.92] [2.93] [2.95] [3.01] 
Age of respondent -0.0168*** -0.0173*** -0.0174*** -0.0186*** 
 [-4.42] [-4.23] [-4.39] [-4.88] 
Spouse’s occupational prestige score   0.00177   
  [0.65]   
Middle-class    0.198*** 
    [2.72] 
Upper-class    0.313* 
    [1.68] 
Constant -1.479*** -1.572*** -1.440*** -1.505*** 
 [-8.68] [-7.16] [-7.61] [-8.71] 
Dependent Variable: Not Very Happy with Marriage     
Spouse has BA or graduate degree  -0.102*  -0.0966* -0.0517 
 [-1.94]  [-1.82] [-0.96] 
Spouse's labor force participation -0.00223 0.0346 -0.00406 -0.00987 
 [-0.05] [0.67] [-0.09] [-0.21] 
Log size of population in city/town of residence 0.000748 0.00376 0.000186 0.00294 
 [0.07] [0.31] [0.02] [0.26] 
Unemployed 0.159* 0.165* 0.153* 0.133 
 [1.74] [1.70] [1.68] [1.45] 
Divorced in the past -0.00509 -0.00836 -0.0109 -0.00836 
 [-0.10] [-0.15] [-0.21] [-0.16] 
Age of respondent 0.00304 0.00334 0.00311 0.00470** 
 [1.30] [1.32] [1.32] [1.99] 
College or graduate degree  -0.175*** -0.208*** -0.160*** -0.0975* 
 [-3.47] [-4.11] [-3.11] [-1.84] 
Protestant -0.290*** -0.287*** -0.254*** -0.286*** 
 [-4.80] [-4.42] [-4.08] [-4.73] 
Catholic -0.128* -0.113 d -0.103 d -0.123* 
 [-1.93] [-1.59] [-1.50] [-1.87] 
Other religions -0.108 -0.0686 -0.117 -0.100 
 [-1.17] [-0.69] [-1.25] [-1.09] 
White 0.00524 -0.0506 0.0247 0.0387 
 [0.06] [-0.52] [0.29] [0.46] 
Black 0.382*** 0.370*** 0.366*** 0.391*** 
 [3.54] [3.04] [3.21] [3.64] 
Has child(ren) 0.147** 0.162*** 0.163*** 0.145** 
 [2.50] [2.59] [2.69] [2.47] 
Spouse’s occupational prestige score   -0.00498***   
  [-2.89]   
Republican party affiliation   -0.181***  
   [-3.27]  
Democratic party affiliation   -0.0694  
   [-1.28]  
Middle-class    -0.238*** 
    [-5.03] 
Upper-class    -0.361*** 
    [-2.92] 
Constant -0.363*** -0.166 -0.339** -0.378*** 
 [-2.59] [-0.97] [-2.38] [-2.69] 
Observations 3,796 3,309 3,796 3,796 
 -0.608*** -0.649*** -0.443
d -0.639*** 
Wald Test of =0 (Chi-squared) 9.138 12.87 2.338 9.746 
t statistics in brackets; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, d p< 0.15. The matrix of variance-covariance is 
calculated using the Huber/White Robust estimator. 
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Table 4: Marginal Effects from Column 1 of Tables 2 and 3 
 Women Men 
 Pr(I=1|U=1) Pr(I=1) Pr(I=1|U=1) Pr(I=1) 






































Unemployed - - 0.0085 0.0089 
 - - [1.10] [0.46] 








































White -0.0026*  0.0002  
 [1.95]  [0.06]  
Black 0.0034*  0.0112**  
 [1.92]  [2.21]  
Has child(ren) 0.0059**  0.0043**  
 [2.47]  [2.11]  
Observations 4,607 4,607 3,796 3,796 
z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; d significant at 15%. 
dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Standard errors are calculated using the Delta method. 
marginal effects. Table 4 reports i) the marginal success probability for the infidelity equation 
Pr(I=1) and ii) the conditional predicted probability of infidelity given that one is not very happy 
in marriage Pr(I=1 | U=1). All marginal effect calculations are based on model estimates reported 
in Column 1 of Tables 2 and 3, utilizing the Delta-method. Table A2 in the Appendix provides 
comparable marginal effects using a single-equation probit model and shows that ignoring the 
simultaneity between infidelity and happiness greatly biases marginal effect estimates. This result 
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together with the finding that  is statistically different from zero implies that single-equation 
probit estimates significantly underestimate the impact of happiness on the likelihood of marital 
infidelity.  
Are there gender-related differences linked to infidelity? To answer this question, we first 
perform a Wald Test to assess whether men and women should be pooled together. The null 
hypothesis that there is no difference in the coefficients for men and women is rejected at all 
standard levels of significance. The Wald Test is conducted by running a bivariate probit model 
including all covariates plus interaction terms of these covariates with a gender dummy (female). 
Then we conduct a joint test of significance for all interaction terms. In addition, marginal effects 
reported in Table 4 clearly demonstrate that the covariates considered in this study affect the 
probability of infidelity differently for both men and women. These findings provide evidence 
that the samples of men and women should not be pooled together. They also reject Fair’s (1978) 
prediction that men and women respond similarly to the costs and benefits of infidelity in favor 
of the differential behavioral prediction of Elmslie and Tebaldi (2008). For example, either 
conditional or not on marital happiness status, the impact of being not very happy in marriage is 
about twice as predictive of infidelity for men than for women. 
A. Happiness with Marriage  
Consistent with the theoretical expectations of Fair (1978) and Elmslie and Tebaldi (2008), 
and empirical work of Li and Racine (2004), Potter (2011), and Adamopoulou (2013), Tables 2 
and 3 show that the coefficient on the dummy variable "not very happy with marriage" is positive 
and statistically different from zero in all model specifications for both men and women. This 
result implies that happiness with marriage affects a person's likelihood to seek relationships 
outside of his/her marriage.  
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 4 show the marginal effect of happiness with marriage on 
infidelity. Our estimates show that the probability that a woman has an affair increases about 11 
percent if she is not very happy with her marriage while the probability of a man having an affair 
increases about 22 percent. Columns 1 and 3 of Table 4 report the conditional predicted probability 
of infidelity given that a person is not very happy with his/her marriage [Pr(I=1 | U=1)]. These 
marginal effects show the effect of happiness with marriage on infidelity netting out of the indirect 
influence of the variables included in the not very happy with marriage equation. Under this 
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condition, the probability of a woman having an affair increases about 4 percent if she is not very 
happy with her marriage while the probability of a man having an affair increases about 9 percent. 
These results are consistent across regressions and in both the conditional and unconditional cases; 
the effect of being not very happy with marriage is twice as large for men as it is for women. These 
results mirror the overall infidelity differential between men and women from Table 1. Married 
men are twice as likely to have an affair even though women are 2.5 percent more likely to report 
being not very happy in their marriage. Since men are twice as likely as women to respond to being 
not very happy with a marriage by having an affair, the results favor the differential response 
prediction of Elmslie and Tebaldi (2008) over the gender neutral prediction of Fair (1978).  This 
result holds when controlling for other factors such as marital tenure, proxied by age (Li and 
Racine, 1994), in Fair’s theoretical model. 
It is possible that our results derive from a tendency of women to under-report infidelity 
relative to men (Andrews et al., 2008). The result that men are more likely to have an affair is well 
established in both the economics and psychology literature (Brewer et al., 2000; Cameron, 2002; 
Elmslie and Tebaldi, 2008; Smith, 2012; Johnson, 1973; Thompson, 1983; Waite and Gallagher, 
2000; Hansen, 1987; McAlister et al., 2005; and Lalasz and Weigel, 2011). While consistent across 
a number of studies, the problem of under-reporting may be behind all of the results. To consider 
this possibility, we investigated several studies (e.g. Lalasz and Weigel, 2011; Hansen, 1987; 
Ajzen, 1985, 1989; McAlister et al., 1985;) that had general questions regarding sexual behavior 
as well as questions involving infidelity, those studies dealing with intent to commit infidelity, and 
a study that controls for the effect of female prostitution and male clients (Brewer et al., 2000). 
All studies find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that both genders answer surveys 
regarding sexual behavior similarly, if not truthfully, and that men are more likely to enter an 
extramarital affair than women. For example, Brewer et al. (2000) utilize the GSS and find that 
after controlling for the differential use of prostitutes by men versus women, the differential in 
infidelity disappears.   
Finally, we break our sample into 10-year age cohorts and show the means of those 
reporting an affair by group in Table A1 in the Appendix. For the group 20 to 29, 5.7% of women 
and 7.1% of men report having sex with more than one person in the previous year. This difference 
is not statistically significant. For the 30 - 39 (40 - 49) age cohort, 2.1% (2.1%) of women and 
5.0% (4.8%) of men report multiple sex partners in the previous year. For the 50 to 59-year age 
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group, the percentages are 0.5% and 2.8%, respectively. Infidelity declines much more rapidly for 
women than men, which is consistent with biological factors discussed above.  
B. Spousal characteristics  
Elmslie and Tebaldi (2008) suggest that spousal characteristics determine the potential 
costs (e.g. forgone income) of an affair. Thus, we include spouse’s labor force participation and 
educational attainment in the infidelity equation. We also consider spouse’s occupational prestige. 
In all regressions of Tables 2 and 3, the coefficients on spouse’s educational attainment in the 
infidelity equation are statistically insignificant for both men and women. This implies that a 
spouse’s educational attainment has no direct effect on the probability that men will have affairs. 
Spousal occupational prestige also has no significant effect for men or women. However, spouse’s 
educational attainment as well as occupational prestige are inversely related to the probability that 
a person will not be very happy in his/her marriage. Thus, the effect of spousal education and 
occupational prestige on infidelity is captured through its effect on marital happiness.  
Controlling for spouse’s educational attainment, Columns 2 and 4 of Table 4 show that the 
probability that a woman or man has an affair decreases if his/her partner is in the labor force. This 
effect is only marginally significant for men. This implies that for women, the potential costs of 
infidelity rise -- thus reducing the likelihood of marital infidelity -- when the spouse participates 
in the labor market. It also supports the evolutionary biology argument that women marry for 
resources. Spousal labor force participation also affects marital happiness and, thus, has an indirect 
effect on infidelity via its positive impact on marriage happiness.  
C. Place of residence and employment status 
Tables 2 and 3 show that the coefficients on the population of the city/town of residence 
are statistically insignificant in all regressions for both men and women. Hence, we find very little 
evidence that increased anonymity and access to a larger pool of potential partners increases the 
likelihood that an individual will have an extramarital affair. This result differs from Elmslie and 
Tebaldi (2008) as they find evidence that increased anonymity increased the likelihood that a 
woman has an affair.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 show that a woman who is a full-time homemaker is less likely 
to have an affair, but about half of the overall effect is due to the differential in marital happiness. 
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This result suggests that women who stay at home are less likely to have an affair either because 
they are happier with their marriages or because they have limited access to potential extramarital 
partners (e.g. coworkers). For men, we replace the homemaking variable with unemployment, but 
this variable is insignificant in all regressions. 
D. Divorce  
Our results provide strong evidence that married people who went through divorce in the 
past are more likely to have sexual partners outside the marriage. This finding is consistent with 
the sociological literature.  Since infidelity is a major cause of divorce, the result may come from 
two possible sources.  First, people who had an affair in a previous marriage are more likely to 
continue this behavior in a subsequent marriage, and second, people whose current spouse had an 
affair in a previous marriage are more likely to have an affair in a subsequent marriage (Knopp, et 
al. 2017).  Columns 2 and 4 of Table 4 show that married men and women who were divorced are 
more likely to have an extramarital affair. It is important to notice that the marginal effect of 
divorce (columns 2 and 4 of Table 4) on infidelity is significantly larger than the conditional effect 
(columns 1 and 3 of Table 4). This implies that divorce has both a negative effect on marital 
happiness as well as a positive effect on the likelihood of extramarital affairs. Given the personal 
costs of divorce and because infidelity is a major cause of divorce, this result is not surprising.  
E. Age 
We find evidence that a person's age is negatively correlated with infidelity (Columns 2 
and 4 of Table 4), but the effect is smaller for men. This result is consistent with expectations and 
suggests that the likelihood of infidelity decreases as a person settles in life or because of biological 
factors that decrease the benefits of infidelity as a person ages. Our results are consistent with 
Elmslie and Tebaldi (2008) and the biological explanation that age has a differentiated effect for 
men and women. Since men stay fertile longer into their lives than women do, the biological 
prediction is that men will continue having affairs longer into their lives. 
The results have additional implications for the extant models. Assuming diminishing 
returns to a spouse’s company, Fair (1978) links marital tenure positively to the probability of a 
man or woman having an affair. Our recursive bivariate probit model allows for a new test of this 
prediction. Controlling for marital happiness, Fair (1978) implies no independent relation between 
age and infidelity given that infidelity is modeled only through marital happiness. We find that, 
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after controlling for marital happiness, there is a negative relationship between age and infidelity. 
The existence of an independent age effect, along with its direction are implications of the Elmslie 
and Tebaldi (2008) expected utility model. 
F. Children 
Now we come to the dreaded C word in the marital happiness literature: children. Several 
studies have shown that having children has a negative effect on marital happiness for women (e.g. 
Elmslie and Tebaldi, 2014, Tao, 2005; Tsang et al., 2003; White, et al., 1986; and Feldman, 1971). 
The only counter example in the literature is Marini (1980). Using the GSS, for example, Elmslie 
and Tebaldi (2014) find that each additional child decreases a woman’s probability of being very 
happy by about 2 percent. Most of the literature has found no effect on male marital happiness. 
These results are consistent with arguments that most of the burden of child rearing falls on 
mothers. 
Our results from Tables 2 and 3 consistently show a negative effect of children on both 
genders. Having children increases the probability of being not very happy in marriage across the 
board. There may be endogeneity concerns with this result. It could be that people in unhappy 
marriages are more likely to have children and/or the presence of children causes people to stay in 
unhappy marriages. Elmslie and Tebaldi (2014), however, find no evidence that generally unhappy 
people are more likely to have children. Moreover, evidence from psychology (Feldman, 1971; 
Miller, 1976; and White et al., 1986) show that the causality goes primarily in the direction from 
children to lower marital happiness as the presence of children leads to decreased communication 
and increased conflicts between spouses. Additionally, Grossbard and Mukhopadhyay (2013) find 
that children have a negative impact on feelings of love between spouses, which is likely to be 
associated with decreased marital happiness. Also from psychology, however, Glenn and 
McLanahan (1982) find that spouses are more likely to stay in an unhappy marriage if children are 
present. Given this general result, however, children increase the probability of an affair due to 
their impact on happiness for men and women. Table 4 also shows that a man or a woman with 
children is more likely to have an affair. These results imply that children make marriages less 
happy and less likely to be monogamous.   
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G. Social Class 
Column 4 of Tables 2 and 3 shows that social class affects the likelihood of infidelity. In 
the infidelity equation, the coefficients on middle-class and upper-class are statistically 
insignificant for women but significant for men. In addition, in the marital happiness equation, the 
coefficient on middle-class is statistically significant for women and the coefficients on both 
middle- and upper-classes are significant for men. Interestingly, these findings suggest that social 
class is an important predictor for male infidelity but not for female. The differential strength of 
the impact of class on infidelity appears to be due to men having a direct and indirect effect via 
marital happiness while women only see an indirect effect of class on the probability of having an 
affair, and only for middle-class women. This indicates that social class as perceived by the man 
himself is a strong determinant of infidelity. While there is a potential endogeneity issue with this 
result, it is consistent with the Elmslie and Tebaldi (2008) expected utility model which is based 
partly on evolutionary biology in that men with more resources have a larger supply of potential 
mates, and that they are likely to act on the looser constraint. These results are also consistent with 
the Pongou and Serrano (2009) model in that the costs of developing an infidelity network will be 
lower if a wife is less likely to divorce a higher-class male due to the expectation of lost resources. 
H. Findings’ Robustness  
We tested several alternative model specifications not reported in the paper. In particular, 
the following variables were tested in both the infidelity and “not very happy” equations: a dummy 
variable indicating whether the person works full or part time, how often a person attends religious 
services, a dummy identifying if the person is religious or not, and time-trend dummies. In all 
regressions, the coefficients on these variables were neither significant at the standard levels nor 
affected the size or the significance of the coefficients of other variables included in the model, so 
we do not include them in our parsimonious specification here. Additional regression analysis 
(available upon request) shows that our results are not affected by religiosity and a person’s own 
education. 
V. Conclusions 
This study contributes to the understanding of marital infidelity by providing a 
comprehensive and robust empirical analysis of the factors affecting a person’s behavior in respect 
to infidelity. The empirical strategy employed in this paper corrects for endogeneity between 
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marital happiness and infidelity, which allows this result to be confidently asserted for in the 
literature. We find that happiness with marriage is the single most relevant factor explaining 
infidelity for both men and. While this result is intuitive and unsurprising, some results stand out 
in our analysis. 
Contradicting Fair (1978), we find that men and women respond differently to the costs 
and benefits of infidelity. This study also provides evidence that age, which has a strong link to 
biology and the implicit benefits of infidelity, has a noticeable impact on marital infidelity. 
Divorced men and women are more likely to have an affair. Spousal labor force participation 
reduces the likelihood of an affair for women and has a small impact for men. Educational 
attainment has stronger effects on infidelity for men than for women. Social class also plays an 
important role in infidelity and affects the likelihood of infidelity for both men and women, even 
though the effect of social class on infidelity is only through marital happiness for women while it 
has both a direct and indirect effect for men. 
In general, this study shows that men and women respond differently to the costs and 
benefits of infidelity, which is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Elmslie and Tebaldi 
(2008) and counter to those of Fair (1978). This finding, however, calls for further theoretical and 
empirical research on the subject because it is unclear if the infidelity-utility functions of men and 
women are fundamentally different (as with biology-related theories) or if unobservable factors 
might be driving the results and biasing the estimated coefficients. With this proviso stated, our 
results are clearly pointing in the direction that, given equal ‘prices’, men and women will choose 
differently when making decisions related to marital infidelity. Additionally, our results on the 
effects of both martial happiness and age on infidelity are consistent with the model by Elmslie 
and Tebaldi (2008), but not with Fair (1978). 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Proportion of Married Individuals who Reported an Affair 
Age Cohort Women Men t-test for equal mean 
Pr(|T| > |t|) 
20 -29 yrs (n=1,355) 5.7% 7.1% 0.3204 
30 - 39 yrs (n=3,039 2.1% 5.0% 0 
40 - 49 yrs (n=2,914) 2.1% 4.8% 0 
50 - 59 yrs(n=2,064) 0.5% 2.8% 0 
60 + years (n=2,115) 0.0% 1.7% 0 
All ages (n=11,486) 2.3% 4.6% 0 
Source: Authors’ calculations using pooled data (1991-2012) from the General Social Survey. 
Note: The sample size considered here is slightly larger than that in the rest of the paper. For the regression analysis, 
observations for which data on marital infidelity were available, but required covariates were missing were dropped 
from the analysis. The proportions reported above, however, are statistically the same as those calculated using the 
restricted sample.   
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Table A2: Single-Equation Probit Model: Marginal Effects 
 Women Men 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Not very happy with marriage 0.0172*** 0.0198*** 0.0430*** 0.0440*** 
 [3.75] [4.26] [6.17] [6.25] 
Spouse has BA or graduate degree  -0.00118 -0.00528 -0.00614 -0.00915 
 [-0.19] [-0.99] [-0.73] [-1.18] 
Spouse's labor force participation -0.0151*** -0.0159*** -0.0126* -0.0102 
 [-2.69] [-2.80] [-1.77] [-1.44] 
Log size of population in city/town of residence 0.00186 0.00171 0.000486 0.00258 
 [1.62] [1.47] [0.29] [1.53] 
House keeping -0.0123** -0.0102*   
 [-2.23] [-1.85]   
Unemployed   0.0129 0.0136 
   [1.01] [1.05] 
Divorced in the past 0.0150*** 0.0171*** 0.0248*** 0.0242*** 
 [3.04] [3.37] [3.11] [3.06] 
Age of respondent -0.00186*** -0.00181*** -0.00152*** -0.00162*** 
 [-6.25] [-6.23] [-3.91] [-4.30] 
College or graduate degree  -0.00637  -0.00101  
 [-1.02]  [-0.13]  
Protestant -0.00871  -0.00586  
 [-1.33]  [-0.61]  
Catholic -0.0159**  -0.0104  
 [-2.10]  [-0.96]  
Other religion -0.0133  0.00674  
 [-1.36]  [0.51]  
White -0.00297  -0.0184  
 [-0.38]  [-1.47]  
Black 0.00251  0.0287*  
 [0.25]  [1.90]  
Has child(ren) 0.0156**  -0.0127  
 [2.17]  [-1.45]  
Observations 4,607 4,607 3,796 3,796 
z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; d significant at 15%. 
dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Robust standard errors. 
